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Abstract
We consider the classical setting of private information retrieval (PIR) of a single
message (file) out of M messages from N distributed databases under the new con-
straint of asymmetric traffic from databases. In this problem, the ratios between the
traffic from the databases are constrained, i.e., the ratio of the length of the answer
string that the user (retriever) receives from the nth database to the total length of all
answer strings from all databases is constrained to be τn. This may happen if the user’s
access to the databases is restricted due database availability, channel quality to the
databases, and other factors. For this problem, for fixed M , N , we develop a general
upper bound C¯(τ ), which generalizes the converse proof of Sun-Jafar, where database
symmetry was inherently used. Our converse bound is a piece-wise affine function
in the traffic ratio vector τ = (τ1, · · · , τN ). For the lower bound, we explicitly show
the achievability of
(
M+N−1
M
)
corner points. For the remaining traffic ratio vectors,
we perform time-sharing between these corner points. The recursive structure of our
achievability scheme is captured via a system of difference equations. The upper and
lower bounds exactly match for M = 2 and M = 3 for any N and any τ . The results
show strict loss of PIR capacity due to the asymmetric traffic constraints compared
with the symmetric case of Sun-Jafar which implicitly uses τn =
1
N
for all n.
1 Introduction
Protecting the privacy of downloaded information from curious publicly accessible databases
has been the focus of considerable research within the computer science community [1–5].
∗This work was supported by NSF Grants CNS 13-14733, CCF 14-22111, CNS 15-26608 and CCF 17-
13977. A shorter version is submitted to IEEE ISIT 2018.
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The problem of privacy has become even more relevant today in the presence of efficient data-
mining techniques. Private information retrieval (PIR), introduced by Chor et al. in [1],
studies the privacy of the downloaded content from public databases. In the classical PIR
setting, a user requests to download a certain message (or file) out of M distinct messages
from N non-communicating (non-colluding) databases without leaking the identity of the
desired message to any individual database. The contents of these databases are identical.
The user prepares N queries, one for each database, such that the queries do not reveal the
user’s interest in the desired message. Upon receiving these queries, each database responds
truthfully with an answering string. The user needs to be able to reconstruct the entire
message by decoding the answer strings from all databases. PIR schemes are designed to be
more efficient than the trivial scheme of downloading all the files stored in the databases.
The efficiency of a retrieval scheme is measured by the retrieval rate, which is the ratio of the
number of decodable desired message symbols to the number of total downloaded symbols.
Recently, the PIR problem is revisited by information theorists [6–11]. The information-
theoretic reformulation of the problem assumes that the messages are of arbitrarily large size
and hence the upload cost can be neglected with respect to the download cost [8] in contrast
to the computer science formulation. This formulation provides an absolute guarantee (as
opposed to computational PIR, e.g., [3,5]). In the leading work [12], Sun and Jafar introduce
the PIR capacity notion to characterize the fundamental limits of the PIR problem. The PIR
capacity is defined as the supremum of PIR rates over all achievable retrieval schemes. [12]
determines the exact capacity of the classical PIR to be C = (1 + 1
N
+ 1
N2
+ · · ·+ 1
NM−1
)−1.
Following the work of [12], the fundamental limits of many interesting variants of the classical
PIR problem have been considered, such as: PIR from colluding databases, robust PIR,
symmetric PIR, PIR from MDS-coded databases, PIR for arbitrary message lengths, multi-
round PIR, multi-message PIR, PIR from Byzantine databases, secure symmetric PIR with
adversaries, cache-aided PIR, PIR with private side information (PSI), PIR for functions,
storage constrained PIR, and their several combinations [13–36].
A common property of the achievability schemes constructed for these PIR problems is
that they exhibit a symmetric structure across the databases. In most existing PIR schemes,
the user retrieves pieces of the desired message from all databases, and generates and uses
side information at all databases in a symmetric manner. This enables the user to balance
the load of retrieval of the desired message equally among the databases, and re-use the side
information generated from one database equally in all the remaining databases. Now, con-
sider the following scenarios that render symmetry assumption unworkable: Varying database
availability: Certain databases are available only a fraction of the time other databases are
available for downloads. Different capacities: The capacities of the links (bit pipes) from
the databases to the user have different capacities. This may be due to different physical
locations of the databases, e.g., the user may be able to access physically closer databases
more often than physically distant databases, or it may be due to the quality of the physical
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layer communication channel, e.g., the bandwidths (rates) of the download channels may be
different for different databases. In these cases, the user is forced to deal with each database
differently, i.e., the user should utilize the databases which have better quality links more
often than the other databases. This breaks the database symmetry assumption, makes load
balancing of desired message and side information more challenging, and poses the following
interesting questions: Can we perform efficient PIR without applying database symmetry?
Is there a fundamental PIR rate loss due to not being able to use symmetric schemes?
Motivated by these practical scenarios, we consider the PIR problem under asymmetric
traffic constraints. Formally, we consider a classical PIR setting with N replicated and non-
communicating databases storing M messages. We assume that the nth database responds
with a tn-length answer string. We constrain the lengths of the answer strings such that
tn = λnt1 for n ∈ {2, · · · , N}. This, in turn, forces the ratios between the traffic from
the databases to be 1 : λ2 : λ3 : · · · : λN . We denote the traffic ratio with respect to the
total download by a vector τ = (τ1, · · · , τN), where τn =
λn∑N
j=1 λj
. We aim at characterizing
the capacity of this PIR problem, C(τ ), as a function of the given traffic ratio vector τ
for arbitrary M and N . We note that in this problem, we do not constrain t1 itself, but
rather constrain the ratios between the responses according to τ ; in fact, we assume that t1
can grow arbitrarily large to conform with the classical information-theoretic formulation.
Furthermore, we remark that although our problem seems to be related to the upload-
constrained PIR problem [12], we note that the upload-constrained problem investigates the
minimum possible query size if the user and the databases exchange a codebook prior to the
retrieval process, while in the asymmetric traffic constrained problem here we do not assume
the existence of a codebook, and hence we minimize the number of queries subject to an
additional constraint on the traffic ratios.
In this paper, we investigate the fundamental limits of the PIR problem under asymmetric
traffic constraints. To that end, we develop a novel upper bound for the capacity C¯(τ ).
This generalizes the converse proof of [12] to incorporate the asymmetric traffic constraints.
Originally, the proof in [12] exploits the database symmetry. The rationale is that even if
the optimal scheme is not symmetric, we can transform it into a symmetric scheme without
changing the retrieval rate by means of time-sharing [12]. In our case, we cannot use this
technique as we must deal with the databases differently. We characterize the upper bound as
a piece-wise affine function in τ (see Theorem 1). The upper bound implies that asymmetry
fundamentally hurts the retrieval rate (see Corollary 1 and Remark 4). Then, we propose
explicit achievability schemes for
(
M+N−1
M
)
corner points. Each corner point corresponds to
a specific partitioning of the databases according to the number of side information symbols
that are used simultaneously within the initial round of the download. We describe the
achievability scheme via a system of difference equations in the number of stages at each
round of the download (which is parallel to [22]). For any other traffic ratio vector τ , we
employ time-sharing between the corner points that enclose τ . We provide an explicit rate
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expression for the case of N = 2 for arbitrary M . We show that the upper bound and the
lower bound exactly match for the cases of M = 2 and M = 3 messages for any N and any
τ , leading to the exact capacity C(τ ) for these cases.
2 System Model
Consider a classical PIR model with N non-communicating and replicated databases storing
M messages (or files). Each database stores the same set of messagesW1:M = {W1, · · · ,WM}.
Messages W1:M are independent and identically distributed over all vectors of size L picked
from a finite field FLq , i.e.,
H(Wi) = L, i ∈ {1, · · · ,M} (1)
H(W1, · · · ,WM) =ML, (q-ary units) (2)
In the PIR problem, a user wants to retrieve a message Wi ∈ W1:M correctly without
revealing any information about the identity of the message i to any individual database.
To that end, the user submits a query Q
[i]
n to the nth database. The messages and the
queries are statistically independent due to the fact that the user does not know the message
realizations in advance, i.e.,
I(W1:M ;Q
[i]
1:N) = 0 (3)
where Q
[i]
1:N = {Q
[i]
1 , · · · , Q
[i]
N}. The nth database responds truthfully by an answer string
A
[i]
n . The answer string A
[i]
n is a deterministic function of the query Q
[i]
n and all the messages
W1:M , hence
H(A[i]n |Q
[i]
n ,W1:M) = 0, n ∈ {1, · · · , N} (4)
In the PIR model with asymmetric traffic constraints, the lengths of the answer strings
are different (see Fig. 1). More specifically, we assume that the nth database responds with
a tn-length answer string, such that tn = λnt1, where λn is the ratio between the traffic
from the nth database to the traffic from the first database. Without loss of generality,
we assume that the first database has the highest traffic and the remaining databases are
ordered descendingly in λn. Hence, {λn}
N
n=1 is a non-increasing monotone sequence with
λ1 = 1, and λn ∈ [0, 1], i.e.,
H(A[i]n ) ≤ λnt1, i ∈ {1, · · · ,M}, n ∈ {1, · · · , N}, 1 ≥ λ2 ≥ · · · ≥ λN (5)
We define the traffic ratio of the nth database τn as the ratio between the traffic from
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Figure 1: PIR under asymmetric traffic constraints.
the nth database and the total traffic from all databases, i.e.,
τn =
λn∑N
j=1 λj
(6)
We note that there is a one-to-one transformation between the vector λ = (λ1, λ2, · · · , λN)
and the vector τ = (τ1, τ2, · · · , τN ). Thus, λ and τ are used interchangeably within the
context of this paper.
In order to ensure the privacy, at the nth database, the query Q
[i]
n designed to retrieve
Wi should be indistinguishable from the queries designed to retrieve any other message, i.e.,
(Q[i]n , A
[i]
n ,W1:M) ∼ (Q
[j]
n , A
[j]
n ,W1:M), ∀j ∈ {1, · · · ,M} (7)
where ∼ denotes statistical equivalence.
In addition, the user should be able to reconstruct Wi from the collected answer strings
A
[i]
1:N with arbitrarily small probability of error. By Fano’s inequality, we have the following
reliability constraint,
H(Wi|Q
[i]
1:N , A
[i]
1:N) = o(L) (8)
where o(L)
L
→ 0 as L→∞.
For a fixed N , M , and a traffic ratio vector τ , a retrieval rate R(τ ) is achievable if there
exists a PIR scheme which satisfies the privacy constraint (7) and the reliability constraint
(8) for some message lengths L(τ ) and answer strings of lengths {tn(τ )}
N
n=1 that satisfy the
asymmetric traffic constraint (5), such that
R(τ ) =
L(τ )∑N
n=1 tn(τ )
(9)
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We note that in this problem, we do not constrain either the message length L(τ ) or the
lengths of the answer strings tn(τ ), but we rather constrain the ratios of the traffic of each
database with respect to the traffic of the first database. The pair (L(τ ), t1(τ )) can grow
arbitrarily large to conform with the information-theoretic framework.
The capacity of the PIR problem under asymmetric traffic constraints C(τ ) is defined as
the supremum of all achievable retrieval rates, i.e., C(τ ) = sup R(τ ).
3 Main Results and Discussions
Our first result is an upper bound on C(τ ) as a function of τ for any fixed M , N .
Theorem 1 (Upper bound) For the PIR problem under monotone non-increasing asym-
metric traffic constraints τ = (τ1, · · · , τN ), the PIR capacity C(τ ) is upper bounded by
C(τ ) ≤ C¯(τ ) = min
n1,··· ,nM−1∈{1,··· ,N}
1 +
∑N
n=n1+1
τn
n1
+
∑N
n=n2+1
τn
n1n2
+ · · ·+
∑N
n=nM−1+1
τn
n0n1···nM−1
1 + 1
n1
+ 1
n1n2
+ · · ·+ 1
n0n1···nM−1
(10)
The proof of this upper bound is given in Section 4. We have the following remarks.
Remark 1 The minimization in (10) is performed to obtain the tightest bound, i.e., the
bound in (10) is valid for any sequence of {ni}
N
i=1 ⊂ {1, · · · , N}
M−1. In particular, restricting
the minimization in the bound in (10) to monotone non-decreasing sequences {ni}
M−1
i=1 ⊂
{1, · · · , N}M−1 such that n1 ≤ n2 ≤ · · · ≤ nM−1 is still a valid upper bound. For fixed M ,
N , the number of such monotone bounds is
(
M+N−2
M−1
)
.
Remark 2 The upper bound for the capacity function C¯(τ ) in (10) is a piece-wise affine
function in the traffic ratio vector τ .
Remark 3 The upper bound in (10) generalizes the known results about the PIR problem.
By picking n1 = · · · = nM−1 = N , (10) leads to
C(τ ) ≤
1
1 + 1
N
+ 1
N2
+ · · ·+ 1
NM−1
(11)
which is the capacity of PIR with symmetric traffic (no traffic constraints) in [12]. On the
other hand, if τ = (1, 0, 0, · · · , 0), which implies that no traffic is returned from any database
except for the first one, by picking n1 = · · · = nM−1 = 1, the upper bound in (10) leads to
1
M
, which is the capacity of the PIR problem with one database [1].
The following corollary is a direct consequence of Theorem 1. The corollary asserts that
there is a strict capacity loss due to the asymmetric traffic constraints if the traffic ratio of
the weakest link falls below a certain threshold.
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Corollary 1 (Asymmetry hurts) For the PIR problem under monotone non-increasing
asymmetric traffic constraints τ = (τ1, · · · , τN), if τN < τ
∗, such that
τ ∗ =
NM−1 − 1
NM − 1
, N > 1 (12)
then C(τ ) < C, where C = 1
1+ 1
N
+···+ 1
NM−1
is the PIR capacity without the asymmetric traffic
constraints in [12].
Proof: From Theorem 1, the upper bound corresponding to n1 = N − 1, and n2 = · · · =
nM−1 = N is strictly tighter than the capacity without asymmetric traffic constraints C if
1 + τN
N−1
1 + 1
N−1
+ 1
(N−1)N
+ · · ·+ 1
(N−1)NM−1
< C (13)
which leads to
τN
N − 1
(
1 +
1
N
+ · · ·+
1
NM−1
)
<
(
1
N − 1
−
1
N
)(
1 +
1
N
+ · · ·+
1
NM−2
)
(14)
which further simplifies to
τN <
1
N
(
1 + 1
N
+ · · ·+ 1
NM−2
)(
1 + 1
N
+ · · ·+ 1
NM−1
) = ∑M−2i=0 N i∑M−1
i=0 N
i
= τ ∗ (15)
which implies that the upper bound for the capacity under the asymmetric traffic constraint
is strictly less than C, which in turn implies that any achievable rate is strictly less than the
unconstrained capacity. 
Remark 4 As the number of messages M becomes large enough, i.e., as M → ∞, the
traffic ratio threshold in (12) τ ∗ → 1
N
. This implies that as M →∞, any asymmetric traffic
constraint incurs strict capacity loss.
Our second result is a lower bound on C(τ ) as a function of τ for any fixed M , N .
Theorem 2 (Lower bound) For the PIR problem under asymmetric traffic constraints,
for a monotone non-decreasing sequence n = {ni}
M−1
i=0 ⊂ {1, · · · , N}
M , let n−1 = 0, and
S = {i ≥ 0 : ni − ni−1 > 0}. Denote yℓ[k] as the number of stages of the achievable scheme
that downloads k-sums from the nth database, such that nℓ−1 ≤ n ≤ nℓ, and ℓ ∈ S. Let
ξℓ =
∏
s∈S\{ℓ}
(
M−2
s−1
)
. The number of stages yℓ[k] is characterized by the following system of
difference equations:
y0[k] = (n0−1)y0[k−1] +
∑
j∈S\{0}
(nj−nj−1)yj[k−1]
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y1[k] = (n1−n0−1)y1[k−1] +
∑
j∈S\{1}
(nj−nj−1)yj[k−1]
yℓ[k] = n0ξℓδ[k−ℓ−1] + (nℓ−nℓ−1−1)yℓ[k − 1] +
∑
j∈S\{ℓ}
(nj−nj−1)yj[k−1], ℓ ≥ 2 (16)
where δ[·] denotes the Kronecker delta function. The initial conditions of (16) are y0[1] =∏
s∈S
(
M−2
s−1
)
, and yj[k] = 0 for k ≤ j. Consequently, the traffic ratio vector τ (n) =
(τ1(n), · · · , τN(n)) corresponding to the sequence n = {ni}
M−1
i=0 is given by:
τn(n) =
∑M
k=1
(
M
k
)
yj[k]∑
ℓ∈S
∑M
k=1
(
M
k
)
yℓ[k](nℓ − nℓ−1)
, nj−1 + 1 ≤ n ≤ nj (17)
and the achievable rate corresponding to τ (n) is given by:
R(τ (n)) =
∑
ℓ∈S
∑M
k=1
(
M−1
k−1
)
yℓ[k](nℓ − nℓ−1)∑
ℓ∈S
∑M
k=1
(
M
k
)
yℓ[k](nℓ − nℓ−1)
(18)
Moreover, for τ =
∑N
i=1 αiτ (ni) for αi ≥ 0, for all i, and
∑N
i=1 αi = 1, the following is a
lower bound on C(τ ),
C(τ ) ≥ R(τ ) =
N∑
i=1
αiR(τ (ni)) (19)
The proof of Theorem 2 can be found in Section 5. The theorem characterizes an achiev-
able rate for the corner points τ (n) corresponding to any monotone non-decreasing sequence
n = {ni}
M−1
i=0 ⊂ {1, · · · , N}
M . For any other traffic ratio vector τ , the achievability scheme
is obtained by time-sharing between the nearest corner points. We note that due to the
large number of corner points, we do not provide an explicit achievable rate for each corner
point but we rather describe the achievable rate by a system of difference equations. The
solution of this system of difference equations specifies the traffic ratio vector τ (n) and the
achievable rate R(τ (n)) corresponding to the monotone non-decreasing sequence {ni}
M−1
i=0 .
We have the following remarks.
Remark 5 If ni = N for all i ∈ {0, · · · ,M − 1}, then S = {0} and the number of stages of
k-sums is described by the following difference equation for any database
y[k] = (N − 1)y[k − 1] (20)
with initial condition of y[1] = 1. In this case τn =
1
N
for all n, and R = 1
1+ 1
N
+···+ 1
NM−1
,
i.e., the scheme in Theorem 2 reduces to the symmetric scheme in [12] if the sequence n =
(N,N, · · · , N) is used.
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Remark 6 We note that the sequence {ni}
M−1
i=0 suffices to completely specify the traffic ratio
vector τ (n) for every corner point as a consequence of the monotonicity of the sequence, i.e.,
{ni}
M−1
i=0 ⇒ (τ˜0, · · · , τ˜0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n0 elements
, τ˜1, · · · , τ˜1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(n1−n0) elements
, · · · , τ˜M−1, · · · , τ˜M−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(nM−1−nM−2) elements
) (21)
where τ˜j =
∑M
k=1 (
M
k )yj [k]
∑
ℓ∈S
∑M
k=1 (
M
k )yj [k](nℓ−nℓ−1)
.
Remark 7 For fixed M , N , the number of corner points in Theorem 2 corresponds to the
number of monotone non-decreasing sequences n = {ni}
M−1
i=0 , which is
(
M+N−1
M
)
.
The next corollary asserts that the achievable scheme in Theorem 2 is optimal forM = 2
and M = 3 messages for any traffic ratio vector τ and any number of databases N .
Corollary 2 (Capacity for M = 2 and M = 3 messages) For the PIR problem with asym-
metric traffic constraints τ , the capacity C(τ ) for M = 2 and M = 3, and for any arbitrary
N is given by:
C(τ ) =


minn0∈{1,··· ,N}
1+ 1
n0
∑N
n=n0+1
τn
1+ 1
n0
, M = 2
minn0≤n1∈{1,··· ,N}
1+ 1
n0
∑N
n=n0+1
τn+
1
n0n1
∑N
n=n1+1
τn
1+ 1
n0
+ 1
n0n1
, M = 3
(22)
The proof of Corollary 2 is given in Section 6.
Fig. 2 shows the PIR capacity under asymmetric constraints C(λ2) as a function of λ2
(which is bijective to τ ) for the case of M = 3 messages and N = 2 databases. We note
that the capacity C(λ2) is a piece-wise monotone curve in λ2, which consists of
(
M+N−2
M−1
)
= 3
regimes. There exist
(
M+N−1
M
)
= 4 corner points. Specific achievable schemes for the case of
M = 3 and N = 2 are given in Section 5.1. Each corner point shown in Fig. 2 corresponds
to an explicit achievable scheme given in Section 5.1.1. For any other point, time-sharing
between corner points is used to achieve these points as shown in Section 5.1.2.
Fig. 3 shows the capacity region C(λ2, λ3) for the case of M = 3 messages and N = 3
databases as a function of the pair (λ2, λ3) (which is bijective to τ ). Fig. 3 shows that
there exist
(
M+N−1
M
)
= 10 corner points, and
(
M+N−2
M−1
)
= 6 regions. We show the capacity
regions in terms of the triple (λ2, λ3, C(λ2, λ3)). Furthermore, for every region we show the
corresponding (n0, n1) to be plugged in (22). The capacity for any point (λ2, λ3) other than
the corner points is obtained by time-sharing between the corner points that enclose (λ2, λ3).
Specific achievable schemes for M = 3, N = 3 are given in Section 8.2.
Finally, in the following corollary, we specialize the achievable scheme in Theorem 2 to
the case of N = 2 for any arbitrary M .
Corollary 3 (Achievable traffic versus retrieval rate tradeoff for N = 2 databases)
For the PIR problem with N = 2 and an arbitrary M under asymmetric traffic constraints
9
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Figure 2: Capacity function C(λ2) for M = 3, N = 2.
τ = (1− τ2, τ2), τ2 ≤
1
2
, let s2 ∈ {1, · · · ,M − 1}, for the traffic ratio τ2(s2), where
τ2(s2) =
∑⌊M−s2−12 ⌋
i=0
(
M
s2+2i+1
)
M
(
M−2
s2−1
)
+
∑M−s2−1
i=0
(
M
s2+1+i
) (23)
the PIR capacity C(τ2(s2)) is lower bounded by:
C(τ2(s2)) ≥ R(τ2(s2)) =
(
M−2
s2−1
)
+
∑M−s2−1
i=0
(
M−1
s2+i
)
M
(
M−2
s2−1
)
+
∑M−s2−1
i=0
(
M
s2+1+i
) (24)
Moreover, if τ2(s2) < τ2 < τ2(s2+1), and α ∈ (0, 1), such that τ2 = ατ2(s2)+(1−α)τ2(s2+1),
then
C(τ2) ≥ R(τ2) = αR(τ2(s2)) + (1− α)R(τ2(s2 + 1)) (25)
The proof of Corollary 3 is given in Section 7.
Remark 8 Fig. 4 shows the tradeoff between the traffic ratio τ2 and the achievable retrieval
rate R(τ2). We note that as M increases R(τ2) decreases pointwise. We observe that as
M → ∞, the rate-traffic tradeoff converges to R(τ2) = τ2. This implies that for large
enough M , our achievable scheme reduces to time-sharing between the trivial achievable
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Figure 3: Illustration of corner points and regions of C(λ2, λ3) for M = 3, N = 3.
scheme of downloading all the messages from database 1 which achieves a rate of 1
M
, and the
asymptotically-optimal achievable scheme in [6] which achieves R = 1− 1
N
.
4 Converse Proof
In this section, we derive an upper bound for the PIR problem with asymmetric traffic con-
straints. We extend the converse techniques introduced in [12] to account for the asymmetry
of the returned answer strings.
We first need the following lemma, which characterizes a fundamental lower bound on
the interference from the undesired messages within the answer strings, i.e., a lower bound
on
∑N
n=1 tn − L, as a consequence of the privacy constraint. The proof of this lemma can
be found in [12, Lemma 5]. The proof follows for our case since the privacy constraint
does not change in the PIR with asymmetric traffic constraints, and the fact that the proof
in [12, Lemma 5] deals with the length of the entire downloaded answer strings A
[1]
1:N and not
the individual lengths of each answer string, see [12, equations (46)-(47)].
Lemma 1 (Interference lower bound) For the PIR problem under asymmetric traffic
constraints {tn}
N
n=1, the interference from undesired messages within the answer strings
11
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Figure 4: Achievable rate-traffic ratio tradeoff for N = 2.∑N
n=1 tn − L is lower bounded as,
N∑
n=1
tn − L+ o(L) ≥ I
(
W2:M ;Q
[1]
1:N , A
[1]
1:N |W1
)
(26)
In the following lemma, we prove an inductive relation for the mutual information term
on the right hand side of (26). In this lemma, the interference lower bound in (26) is
expanded into two parts. The first part, which contains the answer strings from the first
nm−1 databases A
[m]
1:nm−1 , is dealt with as in the proof of [12, Lemma 6]. For the second part,
which contains the remaining answer strings A
[m]
nm−1+1:N
, each answer string A
[m]
n is bounded
trivially by the length of the answer string tn.
Lemma 2 (Induction lemma) For all m ∈ {2, . . . ,M} and for an arbitrary nm−1 ∈
{1, · · · , N}, the mutual information term in Lemma 1 can be inductively lower bounded
as,
I
(
Wm:M ;Q
[m−1]
1:N , A
[m−1]
1:N |W1:m−1
)
≥
1
nm−1
I
(
Wm+1:M ;Q
[m]
1:N , A
[m]
1:N |W1:m
)
+
1
nm−1
(
L− t1
N∑
n=nm−1+1
λn
)
−
o(L)
nm−1
(27)
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We note that [12, Lemma 6] can be interpreted as a special case of Lemma 2 with setting
nm−1 = N . Intuitively, nm−1 represents the number of databases that can apply the optimal
symmetric scheme in [12] if the user wants to retrieve message Wm−1 from the set ofWm−1:M
messages (i.e., conditioned on W1:m−1).
Proof: We start with the left hand side of (27) after multiplying by nm−1,
nm−1 I
(
Wm:M ;Q
[m−1]
1:N , A
[m−1]
1:N |W1:m−1
)
≥ nm−1 I
(
Wm:M ;Q
[m−1]
1:nm−1 , A
[m−1]
1:nm−1|W1:m−1
)
(28)
≥
nm−1∑
n=1
I
(
Wm:M ;Q
[m−1]
n , A
[m−1]
n |W1:m−1
)
(29)
(7)
=
nm−1∑
n=1
I
(
Wm:M ;Q
[m]
n , A
[m]
n |W1:m−1
)
(30)
(3)
=
nm−1∑
n=1
I
(
Wm:M ;A
[m]
n |Q
[m]
n ,W1:m−1
)
(31)
(4)
=
nm−1∑
n=1
H
(
A[m]n |Q
[m]
n ,W1:m−1
)
(32)
≥
nm−1∑
n=1
H
(
A[m]n |A
[m]
1:n−1, Q
[m]
1:nm−1 ,W1:m−1
)
(33)
(4)
=
nm−1∑
n=1
I
(
Wm:M ;A
[m]
n |A
[m]
1:n−1, Q
[m]
1:nm−1 ,W1:m−1
)
(34)
= I
(
Wm:M ;A
[m]
1:nm−1
|Q
[m]
1:nm−1
,W1:m−1
)
(35)
(3)
= I
(
Wm:M ;Q
[m]
1:nm−1 , A
[m]
1:nm−1|W1:m−1
)
(36)
(3),(4)
= I
(
Wm:M ;Q
[m]
1:N , A
[m]
1:N |W1:m−1
)
−I
(
Wm:M ;A
[m]
nm−1+1:N
|Q
[m]
1:N , A
[m]
1:nm−1,W1:m−1
)
(37)
(4)
= I
(
Wm:M ;Q
[m]
1:N , A
[m]
1:N |W1:m−1
)
−H
(
A
[m]
nm−1+1:N
|Q
[m]
1:N , A
[m]
1:nm−1
,W1:m−1
)
(38)
(5)
≥ I
(
Wm:M ;Q
[m]
1:N , A
[m]
1:N |W1:m−1
)
− t1
N∑
n=nm−1+1
λn (39)
(8)
= I
(
Wm:M ;Wm, Q
[m]
1:N , A
[m]
1:N |W1:m−1
)
− t1
N∑
n=nm−1+1
λn − o(L) (40)
= I (Wm:M ;Wm|W1:m−1) + I
(
Wm:M ;Q
[m]
1:N , A
[m]
1:N |W1:m
)
− t1
N∑
n=nm−1+1
λn − o(L) (41)
= I
(
Wm+1:M ;Q
[m]
1:N , A
[m]
1:N |W1:m
)
+
(
L− t1
N∑
n=nm−1+1
λn
)
− o(L) (42)
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where (28), (29) follow from the non-negativity of mutual information, (30) follows from the
privacy constraint, (31) follows from the independence of
(
Wm:M , Q
[m]
n
)
, (32),(34) follow from
the fact that the answer string A
[m]
n is a deterministic function of
(
Q
[m]
n ,W1:M
)
, (33) follows
from conditioning reduces entropy, (36) follows from the independence of
(
Wm:M , Q
[m]
1:nm−1
)
,
(37) follows from the chain rule, the independence of the queries and the messages, and the
fact that Q
[m]
1:N → Q
[m]
1:nm−1
→ A
[m]
1:nm−1
forms a Markov chain by (4), (38) follows from the fact
that the answer strings A
[m]
1:nm−1 are fully determined from
(
Q
[m]
1:N ,W1:M
)
, (39) follows from
the fact that conditioning reduces entropy and H(Anm−1+1:N) ≤
∑N
n=nm−1+1
tn which is equal
to t1
∑N
n=nm−1+1
λn from the asymmetric traffic constraints, (40) follows from the reliability
constraint. Finally, dividing both sides by nm−1 leads to (27). 
Now, we are ready to derive an explicit upper bound for the retrieval rate under asym-
metric traffic constraints. Applying Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 successively for an arbitrary
sequence {ni}
M−1
i=1 ⊂ {1, · · · , N}
M−1 and observing that
∑N
n=1 tn = t1
∑N
n=1 λn under the
asymmetric traffic constraints, we have the following
t1
N∑
n=1
λn − L+ o˜(L)
(26)
≥ I
(
W2:M ;Q
[1]
1:N , A
[1]
1:N |W1
)
(43)
(27)
≥
1
n1
(
L−t1
N∑
n=n1+1
λn
)
+
1
n1
I
(
W3:M ;Q
[2]
1:N , A
[2]
1:N |W1:2
)
(44)
(27)
≥
1
n1
(
L−t1
N∑
n=n1+1
λn
)
+
1
n1n2
(
L−t1
N∑
n=n2+1
λn
)
+
1
n2
I
(
W4:M ;Q
[3]
1:N , A
[3]
1:N |W1:3
)
(45)
(27)
≥ . . .
(27)
≥
1
n1
(
L−t1
N∑
n=n1+1
λn
)
+
1
n1n2
(
L−t1
N∑
n=n2+1
λn
)
+· · ·+
1∏M−1
i=1 ni

L−t1 N∑
n=nM−1+1
λn


(46)
where o˜(L) =
(
1 + 1
n1
+ 1
n1n2
+ · · ·+ 1∏M−1
i=1 ni
)
o(L), (43) follows from Lemma 1, and the
remaining bounding steps follow from successive application of Lemma 2.
Ordering terms, we have,(
1 +
1
n1
+
1
n1n2
+· · ·+
1∏M−1
i=1 ni
)
L ≤
(
1 +
γ(n1)
n1
+· · ·+
γ(nM−1)∏M−1
i=1 ni
)
t1
N∑
n=1
λn+o˜(L) (47)
where γ(ℓ) =
∑N
n=ℓ+1 λn∑N
n=1 λn
=
∑N
n=ℓ+1 τn corresponds to the sum of the traffic ratios from
databases [ℓ + 1 : N ].
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We conclude the proof by taking L → ∞. Thus, for an arbitrary sequence {ni}
M−1
i=1 , we
have
R(τ ) =
L
t1
∑N
n=1 λn
≤
1 + γ(n1)
n1
+ γ(n2)
n1n2
+ · · ·+ γ(nM−1)∏M−1
i=1 ni
1 + 1
n1
+ 1
n1n2
+ · · ·+ 1∏M−1
i=1 ni
(48)
Finally, we get the tightest bound by minimizing over the sequence {ni}
M−1
i=1 over the set
{1, · · · , N}, as
R(τ ) ≤ min
n1,··· ,nM−1∈{1,··· ,N}
1 + γ(n1)
n1
+ γ(n2)
n1n2
+ · · ·+ γ(nM−1)∏M−1
i=1 ni
1 + 1
n1
+ 1
n1n2
+ · · ·+ 1∏M−1
i=1 ni
(49)
= min
n1,··· ,nM−1∈{1,··· ,N}
1 +
∑N
n=n1+1
τn
n1
+
∑N
n=n2+1
τn
n1n2
+ · · ·+
∑N
n=nM−1+1
τn
∏M−1
i=1 ni
1 + 1
n1
+ 1
n1n2
+ · · ·+ 1∏M−1
i=1
ni
(50)
Remark 9 From the converse proof, we note that we can intuitively interpret ni as the
number of databases that can apply the symmetric traffic scheme in [12] if the number of
messages is reduced to be M − i+ 1. We point out that in the absence of asymmetric traffic
constraints as in [12], all databases can apply symmetric schemes, therefore ni = N for all
i ∈ {1, · · · ,M−1}. Now, since reducing the number of messages cannot decrease the number
of databases that apply the symmetric scheme as the problem would be less constrained (in
terms of the privacy constraint), which leads to more flexibility in terms of satisfying the
traffic constraints, it suffices to evaluate the bound in (10) for monotone non-decreasing
sequences {ni}
M−1
i=1 ⊂ {1, · · · , N}
M−1 such that n1 ≤ n2 ≤ · · · ≤ nM−1.
5 Achievability Proof
The achievability scheme for the PIR problem under asymmetric traffic constraints is inspired
by the PIR schemes in [12, 30]. Our achievable scheme applies message symmetry, and side
information exploitation as in [12, 30]. However, due to the asymmetric traffic constraints,
database symmetry cannot be applied. In an alternative view, we use the side information
in an asymmetric fashion among the databases. The most relevant achievable scheme to our
achievable scheme here is the scheme in [30], in which the bits stored in the user’s cache is
exploited differently depending on the caching ratio. We begin the discussion by presenting
the M = 3, N = 2 case as a concrete example to illustrate the main concepts of the scheme.
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5.1 Motivating Example: M = 3 Messages, N = 2 Databases
In this section, we show the achievability scheme for M = 3, N = 2. We first carry out the
minimization in (10) over n1, n2 ∈ {1, 2}. In this case, we have 4 upper bounds (or effectively
3 bounds if n1 ≤ n2 restriction is applied). By taking the minimum of these bounds for every
λ2 ∈ [0, 1], we have the following explicit upper bound on the capacity as a function of λ2
(which is in bijection to τ2)
C(λ2) ≤


1+3λ2
3(1+λ2)
, 0 ≤ λ2 ≤
1
3
2(1+2λ2)
5(1+λ2)
, 1
3
≤ λ2 ≤
3
4
4
7
, 3
4
≤ λ2 ≤ 1
(51)
To show the achievability of the upper bound in (51), let ai, bi, ci denote randomly and
independently permuted symbols of messages W1, W2, W3, respectively. Define s2 ∈ {0, 1, 2}
to be the number of side information symbols that are used simultaneously in database 2
within the initial round of downloads. First, we show the achievability of the corner points,
i.e., the achievability of the points corresponding to λ2 ∈ {0,
1
3
, 3
4
, 1}.
5.1.1 Achievability of the Corner Points
The λ2 = 0 Corner Point: λ2 = 0 means that the second database does not return any
answer strings. The optimal achievable scheme is to download all files from the first database
(see Table 1). This scheme achieves R = 1
3
= C(0).
Table 1: The query table for M = 3, N = 2, λ2 = 0.
Database 1 Database 2
a1, b1, c1
The λ2 = 1 Corner Point: Since λ1 = 1 by definition, λ2 = 1 means that a symmetric
scheme can be applied to both databases. Thus, the optimal achievable scheme is the optimal
symmetric scheme in [12] (see Table 2). We present the scheme here for completeness. In
this scheme, the user starts with downloading the individual symbols a1, b1, c1 from database
1. Since λ2 = 1, database symmetry can be applied, hence the user downloads a2, b2, c2 from
database 2. Note that in this case, the user does not exploit the side information generated
from database 1 in the first round of downloads, but rather downloads new individual sym-
bols, hence s2 = 0 in this case. The undesired symbols bi, ci, i = 1, 2 can be exploited in
the other database. This can be done by downloading a3 + b2, a4 + c2 from database 1, and
similarly by applying database symmetry, the user downloads a5+ b1, a6+ c1 from database
2. In order to satisfy the privacy constraint, the user applies the message symmetry and
downloads b3+c3 from database 1, and b4+c4 from database 2. Finally, the user exploits the
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newly generated side information by downloading a7+b4+c4 from database 1, and a8+b3+c3
from database 2. Consequently, the user downloads L = 8 symbols in 14 downloads which
results in R = 8
14
= 4
7
= C(1).
Table 2: The query table for M = 3, N = 2, λ2 = 1.
Database 1 Database 2
a1, b1, c1 a2, b2, c2
a3 + b2 a5 + b1
a4 + c2 a6 + c1
b3 + c3 b4 + c4
a7 + b4 + c4 a8 + b3 + c3
The λ2 =
3
4
Corner Point: The user can cut the first round of downloads in database 2
and exploit the side information generated from database 1 directly in the form of sums of
2, i.e., the user downloads a1, b1, c1 from database 1 and then exploits the undesired symbols
as side information by downloading a2 + b1, a3 + c1 from database 2. The user then applies
message symmetry and downloads b2+c2. Since the user uses 1 bit of side information in the
initial download round from database 2, s2 = 1 in this case. Finally, the user exploits the
undesired sum b2 + c2 from database 2 as a side information in database 1 and downloads
a4+ b2+ c2. Using this scheme the user downloads 4 symbols from database 1 and 3 symbols
from database 2, hence λ2 =
3
4
. The user downloads L = 4 desired symbols out of 7
downloads, thus R = 4
7
= C(3
4
). The privacy is satisfied since W1, W2, W3 are independently
and randomly permuted, and since the scheme includes all the possible combinations of the
sums in any round. The query table for this scheme is given in Table 3. We note that this
scheme is exactly the asymmetric achievable scheme presented in [16].
Table 3: The query table for M = 3, N = 2, λ2 =
3
4
.
Database 1 Database 2
a1, b1, c1
a2 + b1
a3 + c1
b2 + c2
a4 + b2 + c2
The λ2 =
1
3
Corner Point: In this case, the user downloads a1, b1, c1 from database 1.
In database 2, the user exploits the side information b1, c1 simultaneously and downloads
a2 + b1 + c1. Due to the fact that 2 side information symbols are used simultaneously in the
initial round of download from database 2, s2 = 2 in this case. Using this scheme the user
downloads 3 symbols from database 1 and 1 symbol from database 2, therefore λ2 =
1
3
. The
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user downloads L = 2 desired symbols in 4 downloads, hence R = 1
2
= C(1
3
). The privacy
follows by the same argument as in the previous case. The query table for this case is given
in Table 4.
Table 4: The query table for M = 3, N = 2, λ2 =
1
3
.
Database 1 Database 2
a1, b1, c1
a2 + b1 + c1
5.1.2 Achievability of Non-Corner Points
In the following, we show that by combining the achievable schemes of the corner points
over different symbols, the upper bound in (51) is tight for any λ2. We note that the privacy
constraint is still satisfied after this combination as each scheme operates over different sets
of symbols and the fact that each scheme satisfies the privacy constraint individually. A
formal argument for proving that combination of private schemes remains private can be
found in [16, Theorem 4]. Let νs2 , where s2 = 0, 1, 2, denote the number of repetitions of the
scheme that uses s2 side information symbols simultaneously in the first round of download
in database 2. By convention, let ν3 denote the number of repetitions of the trivial retrieval
scheme, i.e., when the retrieval is solely done from database 1.
The 0 ≤ λ2 ≤
1
3
Regime: We combine the achievable scheme of λ2 = 0 corner point with
the achievable scheme of λ2 =
1
3
corner point. The achievable scheme of λ2 = 0 downloads
3 symbols from database 1 and 0 symbols from database 2. We perform this scheme ν3
repetitions. The achievable scheme of λ2 =
1
3
downloads 3 symbols from database 1 and
1 symbol from database 2. We perform this scheme ν2 repetitions. Under the asymmetric
traffic constraints, this results in the following system of equations
3ν3 + 3ν2 = t1 (52)
ν2 = λ2t1 (53)
This system has a unique solution (parametrized by t1) of ν2 = λ2t1 and ν3 =
1−3λ2
3
t1. Note
that ν3 ≥ 0 in the regime of 0 ≤ λ2 ≤
1
3
. Since the scheme of λ2 = 0 downloads 1 symbol
from the desired message and the scheme of λ2 =
1
3
downloads 2 symbols from the desired
message. The achievable rate R(λ2) is given by
R(λ2) =
2ν2 + ν3
(1 + λ2)t1
=
1 + 3λ2
3(1 + λ2)
= C(λ2), 0 ≤ λ2 ≤
1
3
(54)
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The 1
3
≤ λ2 ≤
3
4
Regime: Similarly, the user combines the achievable schemes of λ2 =
1
3
and λ2 =
3
4
corner points. The user applies the scheme of λ2 =
1
3
for ν2 repetitions, which
downloads 3 symbols from database 1 and 1 symbol from database 2 and has L = 2. The user
applies the scheme of λ2 =
3
4
for ν1 repetitions, which downloads 4 symbols from database
1 and 3 symbols from database 2 and has L = 4. This results in the following system of
equations
4ν1 + 3ν2 = t1 (55)
3ν1 + ν2 = λ2t1 (56)
which has the following solution: ν1 =
−1+3λ2
5
t1 ≥ 0 and ν2 =
3−4λ2
5
t1 ≥ 0 in the regime of
1
3
≤ λ2 ≤
3
4
. Consequently, the achievable rate is given by
R(λ2) =
4ν1 + 2ν2
(1 + λ2)t1
=
2(1 + 2λ2)
5(1 + λ2)
= C(λ2),
1
3
≤ λ2 ≤
3
4
(57)
The 3
4
≤ λ2 ≤ 1 Regime: The user combines the achievable schemes of λ2 =
3
4
and λ2 = 1
corner points. The user repeats the scheme of λ2 =
3
4
for ν1 repetitions, and the scheme of
λ2 = 1 for ν0 repetitions. This results in the following system of equations
4ν1 + 7ν0 = t1 (58)
3ν1 + 7ν0 = λ2t1 (59)
The solution for this system is given by: ν1 = (1 − λ2)t1 ≥ 0 and ν0 =
−3+4λ2
7
t1 ≥ 0 in the
regime of 3
4
≤ λ2 ≤ 1. The corresponding rate is given by
R(λ2) =
4ν1 + 8ν0
(1 + λ2)t1
=
4
7
= C(λ2),
3
4
≤ λ2 ≤ 1 (60)
Specific Example for Non-Corner Points, λ2 =
1
2
: The query table for this case is
given in Table 5. The user applies the scheme of λ2 =
3
4
for ν1 =
−1+3λ2
5
t1 =
1
10
t1 repetitions,
and the scheme of λ2 =
1
3
for ν2 =
3−4λ2
5
t1 =
1
5
t1 repetitions. Choosing t1 = 10, we have
ν1 = 1 and ν2 = 2. The scheme downloads 10 symbols from database 1 and 5 symbols
from database 2, thus, λ2 =
1
2
. The scheme downloads 8 symbols in 15 downloads, hence
R(1
2
) = 8
15
= 2(1+2λ2)
5(1+λ2)
= C(1
2
).
5.2 Description of the General Scheme
In this section, we describe the general achievable scheme that achieves the retrieval rates
in Theorem 2. We first show explicitly the achievability schemes for corner points, i.e., the
achievability scheme for every monotone non-decreasing sequence {ni}
M−1
i=0 ⊂ {1, · · · , N}
M .
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Table 5: The query table for M = 3, N = 2, λ2 =
1
2
.
Database 1 Database 2
a1, b1, c1 a2 + b1
a3 + c1
b2 + c2
a4 + b2 + c2
a5, b3, c3 a6 + b3 + c3
a7, b4, c4 a8 + b4 + c4
We note that our achievability scheme is different in two key steps: First regarding the
database symmetry, we note that it is not applied over all databases directly as in [12], but
rather it is applied over groups of databases, such as, group 0 includes databases 1 through
n0, group 1 includes databases n0 + 1 through n1, etc. Second, regarding the exploitation
of side information step, we note that each group of databases exploits side information
differently in the initial round of downloading. More specifically, we note that group 0 of
databases do not exploit any side information in the initial round of the download, group
1 exploits 1 side information symbol in the initial round of the download, group 2 exploits
sums of 2 side information symbols in the initial round of the download, and so on.
Next, we show that for non-corner points, time-sharing between corner points is achiev-
able and this concludes the achievability proof of Theorem 2.
5.2.1 Achievability Scheme for the Corner Points
Let sn ∈ {0, 1, · · · ,M − 1} denote the number of side information symbols that are used
simultaneously in the initial round of downloads at the nth database. For a given non-
decreasing sequence {ni}
M−1
i=0 ⊂ {1, · · · , N}
M , let sn = i for all ni−1 + 1 ≤ n ≤ ni with
n−1 = 0 by convention. Denote S = {i : sn = i for some n ∈ {1, · · · , N}}. We follow the
round and stage definitions in [22]. The kth round is the download queries that admit a sum
of k different messages (k-sum in [12]). A stage of the kth round is a query block of the kth
round that exhausts all
(
M
k
)
combinations of the k-sum. Denote yℓ[k] to be the number of
stages in round k downloaded from the nth database, such that nℓ−1 + 1 ≤ n ≤ nℓ. The
details of the achievable scheme are as follows:
1. Initialization: The user permutes each message independently and uniformly using a
random interleaver, i.e.,
xm(i) =Wm(πm(i)), i ∈ {1, · · · , L} (61)
where xm(i) is the ith symbol of the permuted Wm, πm(·) is a random interleaver for
the mth message that is chosen independently, uniformly, and privately at the user’s
side. From the nth database where 1 ≤ n ≤ n0, the user downloads
∏
s∈S
(
M−2
s−1
)
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symbols from the desired message. The user sets the round index k = 1. I.e., the user
starts downloading the desired symbols from y0[1] =
∏
s∈S
(
M−2
s−1
)
different stages.
2. Message symmetry: To satisfy the privacy constraint, for each stage initiated in the
previous step, the user completes the stage by downloading the remaining
(
M−1
k−1
)
k-sum
combinations that do not include the desired symbols, in particular, if k = 1, the user
downloads
∏
s∈S
(
M−2
s−1
)
individual symbols from each undesired message.
3. Database symmetry: Due to the asymmetric traffic constraints, the original database
symmetry step in [12] cannot be applied directly to our problem. Instead, we divide the
databases into groups. Group ℓ ∈ S corresponds to databases nℓ−1+1 to nℓ. Database
symmetry is applied within each group only. Consequently, the user repeats step 2
over each group of databases, in particular, if k = 1, the user downloads
∏
s∈S
(
M−2
s−1
)
individual symbols from each message from the first n0 databases (group 1).
4. Exploitation of side information: This step is also different from [12] because of the
asymmetric traffic constraints. In order to create different lengths of the answer strings,
the initial exploitation of side information is group-dependent as well. More specifically,
the undesired symbols downloaded within the kth round (the k-sums that do not
include the desired message) are used as side information in the (k+1)th round. This
exploitation of side information is performed by downloading (k + 1)-sum consisting
of 1 desired symbol and a k-sum of undesired symbols only that were generated in
the kth round. However, the main difference from [12] is that for the nth database, if
sn > k, then this database does not exploit the side information generated in the kth
round. Thus, the nth database belonging to the ℓth group exploits the side information
generated in the kth round from all databases except itself if sn ≤ k. Moreover, for
sn = k, extra side information can be used in the nth database. This is because
the user can form n0
∏
s∈S\{sn}
(
M−2
s−1
)
extra stages of side information by constructing
k-sums of the undesired symbols in round 1 from the databases in group 0.
5. Repeat steps 2, 3, 4 after setting k = k + 1 until k = M .
6. Shuffling the order of the queries: By shuffling the order of the queries uniformly,
all possible queries can be made equally likely regardless of the message index. This
guarantees the privacy.
5.2.2 Achievability Scheme for Non-Corner Points
In this section, we show that achievability schemes for non-corner points can be derived
by time-sharing between the nearest corner points, i.e., the achievable scheme under τ con-
straints is performed by time-sharing between the corner points of anN -dimensional polytope
that enclose the traffic vector τ . The following lemma formalizes the time-sharing argument.
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Lemma 3 can be thought of as an adaptation of [16, Theorem 4] and [27, Lemma 1] to the
PIR problem under asymmetric traffic constraints.
Lemma 3 (Time-sharing) For the PIR problem under asymmetric traffic constraints τ ,
let the retrieval rate R(τi) be achievable for the traffic ratio vector τi for all i ∈ {1, · · · , N}.
Moreover, assume that τ =
∑N
i=1 αiτi for some {αi}
N
i=1 such that αi ≥ 0, for all i, and∑N
i=1 αi = 1. Then, the following retrieval rate R(τ ) is achievable,
R(τ ) =
N∑
i=1
αiR(τi) (62)
Proof: Let PIRi denote the PIR scheme that achieves retrieval rate R(τi) for a traffic ratio
vector τi. Denote the total download of PIRi by Di and the corresponding message length
by Li.
Now, construct the following PIR scheme with total download D and message length
L. For each database, concatenate the queries from the N PIR schemes with ensuring that
each symbol is queried by one PIR scheme only. Hence, D =
∑N
i=1Di, such that Di = αiD,
for i ∈ {1, · · · , N}, and the download from the nth database is tn(τ ) =
∑N
i=1 tn(τi). This
concatenation of the achievable schemes is feasible under asymmetric traffic constraints since
τ =
∑N
i=1 αiτi. To see this, we note that the nth element of the traffic ratio vector τn is
given by
τn =
tn(τ )
D
=
∑N
i=1 tn(τi)
D
=
∑N
i=1 τ
(i)
n Di
D
=
∑N
i=1 τ
(i)
n αiD
D
=
N∑
i=1
αiτ
(i)
n (63)
where τ
(i)
n denotes the nth element in τi. Since these implications are true for each element
in τ , we have τ =
∑N
i=1 αiτi as required.
PIRi scheme downloads Li symbols from the desired messages, such that
Li = R(τi)Di = αiR(τi)D (64)
Hence, the total message length by concatenating all the achievable schemes together is
L =
N∑
i=1
Li =
N∑
i=1
αiR(τi)D (65)
and the corresponding achievable rate is given by
R(τ ) =
L
D
=
N∑
i=1
αiR(τi) (66)
The reliability constraint follows from the reliability of each PIR scheme. The privacy
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constraint is satisfied due to the fact that each PIR scheme operates on a different portion of
the messages and these portions are picked uniformly and independently. Hence, the privacy
constraint for the concatenated scheme follows from the privacy of each PIR scheme. A
formal treatment of the privacy constraint of concatenated schemes can be found in [16]. 
Thus, Lemma 3 provides an achievability proof for any traffic ratio vector τ that is not
a corner point. Finally, we have the following remark regarding this time-sharing lemma.
Remark 10 We note that although the vector λ = (λ1, · · · , λN) is in bijection with τ =
(τ1, · · · , τN), the time-sharing argument in Lemma 3 does not hold for R(λ). This is due to
the fact that R(λ) is a non-linear function of λ whereas R(τ ) is an affine function of τ .
5.3 Decodability, Privacy, and Calculation of the Achievable Rate
In this section, we prove the decodability, privacy and the achievable rate in Theorem 2. We
note that it suffices to consider the corner points only, as Lemma 3 settles the decodability,
privacy and achievable rate for non-corner points based on the existence of feasible PIR
schemes that achieve the corner points.
Decodability: By construction, in the (k + 1)th round at the nth database, the user
exploits the side information generated in the kth round in the remaining active databases
by adding 1 symbol of the desired message with (k − 1)-sum of undesired messages which
was downloaded previously in the kth round. Moreover, for the nth database belonging to
the ℓth group at the (ℓ+1)th round, the user adds every ℓ symbols of the undesired symbols
downloaded from group 0 to make one side information symbol. Since the user downloads∏
ℓ∈S
(
M−2
ℓ−1
)
symbols from every database in the first n0 databases (group 0), the user can
exploit such side information to initiate n0
∏
ℓ∈S\{ℓ}
(
M−2
ℓ−1
)
stages in the (ℓ+1)th round from
every database in group ℓ. Since all side information symbols used in the (k + 1)th round
are decodable in the kth round or from round 1, the user cancels out these side information
symbols and is left with symbols from the desired message.
Privacy: For every stage of the kth round initiated in the exploitation of the side infor-
mation step, the user completes the stage by including all the remaining
(
M−1
k−1
)
undesired
symbols. This implies that all
(
M
k
)
combinations of the k-sum are included at each round.
Thus, the structure of the queries is the same for any desired message. The privacy con-
straint in (7) is satisfied by the random and independent permutation of each message and
the random shuffling of the order of the queries. This ensures that all queries are equally
likely independent of the desired message index.
Calculation of the Achievable Rate: For a corner point characterized by the non-
decreasing sequence {ni}
M−1
i=0 , as mentioned before, we denote yℓ[k] to be the number of
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stages that admit k-sums downloaded from any database belonging to the ℓth group, i.e.,
the nth database such that nℓ−1+1 ≤ n ≤ nℓ. By construction, we observe that all databases
belonging to the ℓth group are inactive until the (ℓ+1)th round as the user initiates download
in such databases by exploiting ℓ bits of side information simultaneously by definition of the
group. Consequently, we have the initial condition yℓ[k] = 0 for k ≤ ℓ. Since the user
downloads
∏
s∈S
(
M−2
s−1
)
individual symbols (i.e., from round 1) from group 0, we have the
following initial condition y0[1] =
∏
s∈S
(
M−2
s−1
)
.
Now, we note from the side information exploitation step that the user initiates new
stages in the kth round from the nth database depending on the number of stages of the
(k − 1)th round for group 0 and group 1 (i.e., for 1 ≤ n ≤ n1). More specifically, for the
nth database belonging to group 0, the user considers all the undesired symbols downloaded
from all databases (except the nth database) in the (k − 1)th round as side information.
Since database symmetry applies over each group, and from the fact that each stage in the
(k − 1)th round initiates a stage in the kth round, we have
y0[k] = (n0 − 1)y0[k − 1] +
∑
ℓ∈S\{0}
(nℓ − nℓ−1)yℓ[k − 1] (67)
where the left side is the total number of stages in the (k − 1)th round from all the N − 1
databases (i.e., except for the nth database that belongs to group 0). The same argument
holds for group 1 as well, hence
y1[k] = (n1 − n0 − 1)y1[k − 1] +
∑
ℓ∈S\{1}
(nℓ − nℓ−1)yℓ[k − 1] (68)
where (n1−n0−1) denotes the number of databases in group 1 other than the nth database.
For a database belonging to the ℓth group such that ℓ ≥ 2, the user can generate extra
stages by exploiting the symbols downloaded in round 1. To initiate one stage in the (ℓ+1)th
round, the user needs to combine symbols from
(M−1ℓ )ℓ
M−1
=
(
M−2
ℓ−1
)
stages. Therefore, the
number of stages initiated in the (ℓ+1)th round as a consequence of the side information in
round 1 is ξℓ =
y0[1]
(M−2ℓ−1 )
=
∏
s∈S\{ℓ}
(
M−2
s−1
)
. Since these extra side information can be used once
(at the (ℓ+1)th round only) and after that for the kth round, the database exploits the side
information generated in the (k − 1)th round only. We represent this one-time exploitation
of side information in the (ℓ + 1)th round by the Kronecker delta function δ[k − ℓ − 1].
Consequently, the number of stages for the ℓth group, ℓ ≥ 2 is related via the following
difference equation:
yℓ[k] = n0ξℓδ[k−ℓ−1] + (nℓ−nℓ−1−1)yℓ[k − 1] +
∑
j∈S\{ℓ}
(nj−nj−1)yj[k−1] (69)
Now, we are ready to characterize τ (n) and R(τ (n)) in terms of yℓ[k], where ℓ ∈ S and
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k = 1, · · · ,M . For any stage in the kth round, the user downloads
(
M−1
k−1
)
desired symbols
from a total of
(
M
k
)
downloads. Therefore, from a database belonging to the ℓth group, the
user downloads
∑M
k=1
(
M−1
k−1
)
yℓ[k] desired symbols from a total of
∑M
k=1
(
M
k
)
yℓ[k]. The number
of databases belonging to the ℓth group is given by nℓ−nℓ−1. Therefore, the total download
is given by,
N∑
n=1
tn(τ (n)) =
∑
ℓ∈S
M∑
k=1
(
M
k
)
yℓ[k](nℓ − nℓ−1) (70)
Thus, the traffic ratio of the nth database belonging to the ℓth group (i.e., nℓ−1 + 1 ≤
n ≤ nℓ) corresponding to n = {ni}
M−1
i=0 is given by
τn(n) = τ˜ℓ =
∑M
k=1
(
M
k
)
yℓ[k]∑
ℓ∈S
∑M
k=1
(
M
k
)
yℓ[k](nℓ − nℓ−1)
, nℓ−1 + 1 ≤ n ≤ nℓ (71)
Furthermore, the total desired symbols from all databases is given by
L(τ (n)) =
∑
ℓ∈S
M∑
k=1
(
M − 1
k − 1
)
yℓ[k](nℓ − nℓ−1) (72)
which further leads to the following achievable rate
R(τ (n)) =
∑
ℓ∈S
∑M
k=1
(
M−1
k−1
)
yℓ[k](nℓ − nℓ−1)∑
ℓ∈S
∑M
k=1
(
M
k
)
yℓ[k](nℓ − nℓ−1)
(73)
6 Optimality of M = 2 and M = 3 Cases
In this section, we prove Corollary 2, i.e., we prove that the capacity of the PIR problem
under asymmetric traffic constraints C(τ ) for M = 2, 3 is given by (22). We note that since
the upper bound in Theorem 1 is affine in τ and time-sharing rates are achievable from
Lemma 3, it suffices to prove the optimality of all corner points to settle the PIR capacity
C(τ ) forM = 2, 3. In the following, we use Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 to show the optimality
of these corner points.
6.1 M = 2 Messages
We start the proof from the achievability side. From Theorem 2, the corner points are
specified by the non-decreasing sequence n = (n0, n1). In this case, the system of difference
equations in (16) is reduced to
y0[k] = (n0 − 1)y0[k − 1] (74)
y1[k] = n0y0[k − 1] (75)
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for k = 1, 2, where y0[1] = 1, and y1[1] = 0. Hence, y0[2] = n0 − 1, and y1[2] = n0. Hence,
the total downloads for the corner point n = (n0, n1) is
N∑
n=1
tn(τ (n)) =
1∑
ℓ=0
2∑
k=1
(
2
k
)
yℓ[k](nℓ − nℓ−1) = n0(n1 + 1) (76)
Thus, from Theorem 2, the traffic-ratio vector τ (n) is given by
τ˜0 =
(
2
1
)
y0[1] +
(
2
2
)
y0[2]∑N
n=1 tn(τ (n))
=
n0 + 1
n0(n1 + 1)
(77)
τ˜1 =
(
2
1
)
y1[1] +
(
2
2
)
y1[2]∑N
n=1 tn(τ (n))
=
1
n1 + 1
(78)
where τn = τ˜0, for 1 ≤ n ≤ n0, and τn = τ˜1, for n0 + 1 ≤ n ≤ n1, and τn = 0 otherwise.
For the desired symbols, the user downloads L0(τ (n)) symbols from the nth database when
1 ≤ n ≤ n0, and L1(τ (n)) symbols from the nth database when n0 + 1 ≤ n ≤ n1
L0(τ (n)) = y0[1] + y0[2] = n0 (79)
L1(τ (n)) = y1[1] + y1[2] = n0 (80)
Consequently, L = n0L0 + (n1 − n0)L1 = n0n1, and the achievable retrieval rate R(τ (n)) is
given by
R(τ (n)) =
L(τ (n))∑N
n=1 tn(τ (n))
=
n1
n1 + 1
(81)
For the converse, we evaluate the bound in (10) (without the minimization) for n1 = n0,
i.e., we substitute with n0 in the argument of the upper bound. Then, we have the following
upper bound
R(τ (n)) ≤
1 +
∑N
n=n0+1
τn
n0
1 + 1
n0
(82)
=
1 + (n1−n0)τ˜1
n0
1 + 1
n0
(83)
=
n1
n1 + 1
(84)
This concludes the optimality of our achievable scheme for M = 2.
26
6.2 M = 3 Messages
Similarly, for the corner point specified by the non-decreasing sequence n = (n0, n1, n2), we
have the following system of difference equations for k = 1, 2, 3
y0[k] = (n0 − 1)y0[k − 1] + (n1 − n0)y1[k − 1] + (n2 − n1)y2[k − 1] (85)
y1[k] = n0y0[k − 1] + (n1 − n0 − 1)y1[k − 1] + (n2 − n1)y2[k − 1] (86)
y2[k] = n0δ[k − 3] + n0y0[k − 1] + (n1 − n0)y1[k − 1] + (n2 − n1 − 1)y2[k − 1] (87)
with the initial conditions y0[1] = 1, y1[1] = 0, and y2[1] = y2[2] = 0. Evaluating yℓ[k], for
ℓ = 0, 1, 2, and k = 1, 2, 3 recursively leads to y0[2] = n0−1, y1[2] = n0, y0[3] = n1n0−2n0+1,
y1[3] = n1n0 − 2n0, and y2[3] = n1n0. This leads to the following total download
N∑
n=1
tn(τ (n)) =
2∑
ℓ=0
3∑
k=1
(
3
k
)
yℓ[k](nℓ − nℓ−1) = n0(n1n2 + n1 + 1) (88)
The sequence n = (n0, n1, n2) specifies the traffic ratio vector τ (n) such that
τ˜0 =
n0n1 + n0 + 1
n0(n2n1 + n1 + 1)
(89)
τ˜1 =
n1 + 1
n2n1 + n1 + 1
(90)
τ˜2 =
n1
n2n1 + n1 + 1
(91)
where τn = τ˜0 for 1 ≤ n ≤ n0, τn = τ˜1 for n0 + 1 ≤ n ≤ n1, τ = τ˜2 for n1 + 1 ≤ n ≤ n2, and
τn = 0 otherwise.
For the desired symbols, the user downloads L0(τ (n)) symbols from the nth database if
1 ≤ n ≤ n0, L1(τ (n)) symbols if n0+1 ≤ n ≤ n1, and L2(τ (n)) symbols if n1+1 ≤ n ≤ n2,
hence
Lℓ(τ (n)) =
3∑
k=1
(
2
k − 1
)
yℓ[k] = n0n1, ℓ = 0, 1, 2 (92)
Consequently, the following rate is achievable
R(τ (n)) =
n1n2
n1n2 + n1 + 1
(93)
For the converse, pick (n1, n2) in the converse bound to be (n0, n1), which leads to the
following bound
R(τ (n)) ≤
1 +
∑N
n=n0+1
τn
n0
+
∑N
n=n1+1
τn
n0n1
1 + 1
n0
+ 1
n0n1
(94)
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=
1 + (n1−n0)τ˜1
n0
+ (n2−n1)τ˜2
n0
+ (n2−n1)τ˜2
n0n1
1 + 1
n0
+ 1
n0n1
(95)
=
n1n2
n1n2 + n1 + 1
(96)
This concludes the optimality of our achievable scheme for M = 3.
Remark 11 We note that, surprisingly, for the corner points of the cases M = 2 and
M = 3, the number of desired symbols downloaded from each active database is the same
irrespective to the traffic ratio of the database; see (79)-(80) for M = 2 and (92) for M = 3.
This suggests that at these corner points, the optimal scheme performs combinatorial water-
filling for the undesired symbols first, i.e., the nth active database downloads tn−n0 undesired
symbols for M = 2 and tn − n0n1 undesired symbols for M = 3, and then downloads the
same number of desired symbols from all active databases.
7 Achievable Tradeoff for N = 2 and Arbitrary M
For the special case of N = 2, and an arbitraryM , the retrieval rate calculation in Theorem 2
is significantly simplified. Let s2 ∈ {0, · · · ,M−1} be the number of side information symbols
that are used simultaneously in the initial round of download at the second database. Note
that there is a bijection between s2 and the non-decreasing sequence n as n0 = n1 = · · · =
ns2−1 = 1, and ns2 = 2 for any corner point other than the corner point corresponding to
the trivial scheme of downloading the contents of the first database.
The user starts with downloading
(
M−2
s2−1
)
stages of individual symbols (i.e., the user down-
loadsM
(
M−2
s2−1
)
symbols in round 1 from all messages) from the first database to create 1 stage
in the (s2 + 1)th round. After the initial exploitation of side information, the two databases
exchange side information. More specifically, from database 1 in the (s2 + 2k)th round,
where k = 1, · · · ,
⌊
M−s2
2
⌋
, the user exploits the side information generated in database 2 in
the (s2 + 2k − 1)th round to download
(
M−1
s2+2k−1
)
desired symbols (by adding one symbol of
the desired symbols to the (s2 + 2k− 1)-sum of undesired symbols generated in database 2)
from total download in the (s2 + 2k)th round of
(
M
s2+2k
)
. Similarly from database 2, in the
(s2 + 2k + 1)th round, where k = 0, · · · ,
⌊
M−s2−1
2
⌋
, the user exploits the side information
generated in database 1 in the (s2 + 2k)th round, and downloads
(
M−1
s2+2k
)
desired symbols
from total of
(
M
s2+2k+1
)
downloads in the (s2 + 2k + 1)th round.
Consequently, we have
t1(s2) = M
(
M − 2
s2 − 1
)
+
⌊M−s22 ⌋∑
k=1
(
M
s2 + 2k
)
(97)
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t2(s2) =
⌊M−s2−12 ⌋∑
k=0
(
M
s2 + 2k + 1
)
(98)
which further leads to the following total download
t1(s2) + t2(s2) = M
(
M − 2
s2 − 1
)
+
M−s2−1∑
k=0
(
M
s2 + k + 1
)
(99)
Thus, the traffic ratio τ2(s2) is given by
τ2(s2) =
t2(s2)
t1(s2) + t2(s2)
=
∑⌊M−s2−12 ⌋
k=0
(
M
s2+2k+1
)
M
(
M−2
s2−1
)
+
∑M−s2−1
k=0
(
M
s2+k+1
) (100)
The total number of desired symbols is given by
L(s2) =
(
M − 2
s2 − 1
)
+
⌊M−s22 ⌋∑
k=1
(
M − 1
s2 + 2k − 1
)
+
⌊M−s2−12 ⌋∑
k=0
(
M − 1
s2 + 2k
)
(101)
=
(
M − 2
s2 − 1
)
+
M−s2−1∑
k=0
(
M − 1
s2 + k
)
(102)
Thus, the following rate is achievable for N = 2 and arbitrary M
R(s2) =
L(s2)
t1(s2) + t2(s2)
=
(
M−2
s2−1
)
+
∑M−s2−1
k=0
(
M−1
s2+k
)
M
(
M−2
s2−1
)
+
∑M−s2−1
k=0
(
M
s2+k+1
) (103)
8 Further Examples
In this section, we present further examples to clarify the achievable scheme for some addi-
tional tractable values of M , N .
8.1 M = 4 Messages, N = 2 Databases
In this example, we show that the achievable rate R(τ2) does not match the upper bound
C¯(τ2) for all traffic ratios τ2. For M = 4, we have M +1 = 5 corner points, corresponding to
s2 = {0, 1, 2, 3} and another corner point corresponding to the trivial scheme of download-
ing the contents of database 1. Let ai, bi, ci, di denote the randomly permuted symbols of
messages W1,W2,W3,W4, respectively. Then, R(0) =
1
4
by trivially downloading a1, b1, c1, d1
from database 1. In addition, R(1
2
) =
1− 1
2
1−( 1
2
)4
= 8
15
using the symmetric scheme in [12].
29
Corner Point s2 = 1: (See the query table in Table 6.) The user uses 1 bit of side
information in database 2, hence the user starts downloading from round 2 (that admits 2-
sums). The user exploits the side information generated in round 1 by downloading a2 + b1,
a3 + c1, and a4 + d1. The user completes the stage by downloading undesired symbols
consisting of 2-sums that do not include ai, hence the user downloads b2+ c2, b3+d2, c3+d3.
The undesired symbols are exploited in database 1, thus the user downloads a5 + b2 + c2,
a6 + b3 + d2, and a7 + c3 + d3. The user completes the stage by downloading b4 + c4 + d4,
which can be exploited in database 2 by downloading a8 + b4 + c4 + d4. In this case, the
user downloads 8 symbols from database 1 and 7 symbols from database 2, hence we have
τ2 =
7
15
. Since the user downloads L = 8 desired symbols, the achievable rate R( 7
15
) = 8
15
.
Table 6: The query table for M = 4, N = 2, s2 = 1 (corresponding to τ2 =
7
15
).
Database 1 Database 2
a1, b1, c1, d1
a2 + b1
a3 + c1
a4 + d1
b2 + c2
b3 + d2
c3 + d3
a5 + b2 + c2
a6 + b3 + d2
a7 + c3 + d3
b4 + c4 + d4
a8 + b4 + c4 + d4
Corner Point s2 = 2: (See the query table in Table 7.) The user downloads
(
M−2
s2−1
)
= 2
stages of individual symbols (1-sum) from database 1, so that the user forms 2-sums that
can be used in database 2 as side information to start round 3 directly, i.e., by forming
2-sums as side information from the individual symbols, the user effectively skips round 2.
More specifically, the user downloads a3 + b1 + c1, a4 + b2 + d1, a5 + c2 + d2 from database 2
taking into considerations that all these undesired symbols are decodable from database 1.
The user completes the stage by downloading b3 + c3 + d3 that can be further exploited in
database 1 by downloading a6+ b3+ c3+d3. In this case, the user downloads 9 symbols from
database 1 and 4 symbols from database 2, therefore τ2 =
4
13
. The user downloads L = 6
desired symbols, thus, R( 4
13
) = 6
13
.
Corner Point s2 = 3: (See the query table in Table 8.) In this case, the user skips
rounds 2, 3 and jumps directly to round 4 at database 2. Therefore, the user downloads
a2+b1+c1+d1 from database 2, which uses b1+c1+d1 as side information which is decodable
from database 1. Thus, we have τ2 =
1
5
, and the corresponding rate R(1
5
) = 2
5
.
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Table 7: The query table for M = 4, N = 2, s2 = 2 (corresponding to τ2 =
4
13
).
Database 1 Database 2
a1, b1, c1, d1
a2, b2, c2, d2
a3 + b1 + c1
a4 + b2 + d1
a5 + c2 + d2
b3 + c3 + d3
a6 + b3 + c3 + d3
Table 8: The query table for M = 4, N = 2, s2 = 3 (corresponding to τ2 =
1
5
).
Database 1 Database 2
a1, b1, c1, d1
a2 + b1 + c1 + d1
Comparison with the Upper Bound: The upper bound in Theorem 1 can be explicitly
expressed as:
R(τ2) ≤


1
4
+ 3τ2
4
, 0 ≤ τ2 ≤
1
5
2
7
+ 4τ2
7
, 1
5
≤ τ2 ≤
3
8
4
11
+ 4τ2
11
, 3
8
≤ τ2 ≤
7
15
8
15
, 7
15
≤ τ2 ≤
1
2
(104)
We observe that for all the corner points of the achievable scheme, the upper and lower
bounds match. However, the upper bound has an extra corner point (3
8
, 1
2
) which is not
achievable using time-sharing. This is illustrated in Fig. 5
8.2 M = 3 Messages, N = 3 Databases
In this example, we show the capacity-achieving scheme for M = 3, N = 3 (the capacity
region is illustrated in Fig. 3 as a function of C(λ2, λ3)). Let ai, bi, ci denote the permuted
symbols of messages W1,W2,W3, respectively. We show here only the query tables for
achieving non-trivial corner points. In this case, we have
(
M+N−1
M
)
= 10 corner points
corresponding to non-decreasing sequences (n0, n1, n2).
For the pair (τ2, τ3) = (0, 0), the achievable scheme is the trivial scheme that downloads
a1, b1, c1 from the first database only achieving R(0, 0) =
1
3
. For the corner point (1
4
, 0), this
is exactly the same corner point presented in Section 5.1.1 (for λ2 =
1
3
) as τ3 = 0, which
effectively reduces the problem to N = 2 databases. The achievable scheme for this corner
point is illustrated in Table 4, hence R(1
4
, 0) = 1
2
. For the corner point (3
7
, 0), again this
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Figure 5: Upper and lower bounds for R(τ2) for M = 4, N = 2.
point reduces to 2 databases. The achievable scheme is given in Table 3, and R(3
7
, 0) = 4
7
.
For the corner point (1
3
, 1
3
), which is the symmetric-traffic point, the achievable scheme is
the symmetric scheme in [12], which achieves R(1
3
, 1
3
) = 9
13
. For the corner point (1
2
, 0), we
can apply the symmetric achievable scheme for N = 2 databases only as τ3 = 0 in this case,
hence R(1
2
, 0) = 4
7
.
Now, we focus on the non-trivial corner points. As mentioned previously, the pair (s2, s3)
is in bijection with the sequence (n0, n1, n2). Therefore, we enumerate the remaining cases
using the pair (s2, s3).
Corner Point (s2, s3) = (0, 1): In this case, the user does not use the side information
generated in database 1 within the initial download of database 2 (s2 = 0), hence the user
downloads new individual symbols from database 2. The user uses 1 bit of side information
in database 3 in its round of download (round 2). These side information symbols come from
database 1 and database 2. The query table for this case is shown in Table 9. In this case,
we have (τ2, τ3) = (
9
26
, 4
13
), and the achievable rate is R( 9
26
, 4
13
) = 9
13
.
Corner Point (s2, s3) = (0, 2): The user does not exploit the side information generated
from database 1 in the first round of download at database 2. The user uses 2 side information
symbols simultaneously in the initial round (round 3) of download at database 3. Note that
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Table 9: The query table for M = 3, N = 3, (s2, s3) = (0, 1) (i.e., (τ2, τ3) = (
9
26
, 4
13
)).
Database 1 Database 2 Database 3
a1, b1, c1 a2, b2, c2
a3 + b2 a5 + b1 a7 + b1
a4 + c2 a6 + c1 a8 + c1
b3 + c3 b4 + c4 b5 + c5
a9 + b2
a10 + c2
b6 + c6
a11 + b4 + c4 a14 + b3 + c3 a17 + b3 + c3
a12 + b5 + c5 a15 + b5 + c5 a18 + b4 + c4
a13 + b6 + c6 a16 + b6 + c6
in round 3 database 3 receives side information from rounds 1 and 2 of databases 1 and 2.
The query table for this case is shown in Table 10. In this case, we have (τ2, τ3) = (
7
18
, 2
9
),
and the achievable rate is R( 7
18
, 2
9
) = 2
3
.
Table 10: The query table for M = 3, N = 3, (s2, s3) = (0, 2) (i.e., (τ2, τ3) = (
7
18
, 2
9
)).
Database 1 Database 2 Database 3
a1, b1, c1 a2, b2, c2
a3 + b2 a5 + b1
a4 + c2 a6 + c1
b3 + c3 b4 + c4
a7 + b4 + c4 a8 + b3 + c3 a9 + b1 + c1
a10 + b2 + c2
a11 + b3 + c3
a12 + b4 + c4
Corner Point (s2, s3) = (1, 1): In this case, both databases 2 and 3 exploit the side
information generated from database 1 in their initial round of download (round 1). The
query table for this case is shown in Table 11. In this case, we have (τ2, τ3) = (
4
13
, 4
13
), and
the achievable rate is R( 4
13
, 4
13
) = 9
13
.
Table 11: The query table for M = 3, N = 3, (s2, s3) = (1, 1) (i.e., (τ2, τ3) = (
4
13
, 4
13
)).
Database 1 Database 2 Database 3
a1, b1, c1
a2 + b1 a4 + b1
a3 + c1 a5 + c1
b2 + c2 b3 + c3
a6 + b2 + c2 a8 + b3 + c3 a9 + b2 + c2
a7 + b3 + c3
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Corner Point (s2, s3) = (1, 2): In this case, database 2 exploits 1 side information in its
initial download (round 2), while database 3 skips to round 3 directly. Database 3 receives
side information from the round 1 of database 1 and round 2 of database 2. The query table
for this case is shown in Table 12. In this case, we have (τ2, τ3) = (
1
3
, 2
9
), and the achievable
rate is R(1
3
, 2
9
) = 2
3
.
Table 12: The query table for M = 3, N = 3, (s2, s3) = (1, 2) (i.e., (τ2, τ3) = (
1
3
, 2
9
)).
Database 1 Database 2 Database 3
a1, b1, c1
a2 + b1
a3 + c1
b2 + c2
a4 + b2 + c2 a5 + b1 + c1
a6 + b2 + c2
Corner Point (s2, s3) = (2, 2): Both databases 2 and 3 skip round 1 and 2 of downloads
and go directly to round 3, in which they exploits 2 side information symbols simultaneously.
The query table for this case is shown in Table 13. In this case, we have (τ2, τ3) = (
1
5
, 1
5
),
and the achievable rate is R(1
5
, 1
5
) = 3
5
.
Table 13: The query table for M = 3, N = 3, (s2, s3) = (2, 2) (i.e., (τ2, τ3) = (
1
5
, 1
5
)).
Database 1 Database 2 Database 3
a1, b1, c1
a2 + b1 + c1 a3 + b1 + c1
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced the PIR problem under asymmetric traffic constraints τ . We
investigated the fundamental limits of this problem by developing the novel upper bound
C¯(τ ) = minn1,··· ,nM−1∈{1,··· ,N}
1+
∑N
n=n1+1
τn
n1
+
∑N
n=n2+1
τn
n1n2
+···+
∑N
n=nM−1+1
τn
n0n1···nM−1
1+ 1
n1
+ 1
n1n2
+···+ 1
n0n1···nM−1
, for some integer se-
quence {ni}
N
i=1 ⊂ {1, · · · , N}
M−1. The upper bound generalizes the converse proof in [12],
which inherently utilizes database symmetry. The upper bound is a piece-wise affine func-
tion in τ . The upper bound implies a strict capacity loss due to the asymmetric traffic
constraints for certain cases. We developed explicit achievable schemes for
(
M+N−1
M
)
corner
points, and achieved the remaining points by time-sharing. We described the achievable
scheme by means of a system of difference equations. We explicitly derived the achievable
rate for N = 2 and arbitrary M . We proved that the upper bound and the lower bound
exactly match for every τ for the cases of M = 2 and M = 3 for any N .
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